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ABSTRACT
Federal jurisdictions are split on the reach of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA") in
situations where computer-stored trade secrets are stolen by former employees who possessed
authorization to access and use the trade secret information. This comment explores both the
broad and narrow interpretations of the CFAA. It proposes that courts adopt the broad
interpretation, which includes principles of agency law, in order to determine when an
employee is "without authorization" under the CFAA. Courts should also adopt the broad
interpretation in situations where trade secrets are stolen because an employee is only granted
a "limited license" to use and access a trade secret, which defines the parameters of the
employee's authorization. This comment also identifies three different perspectives regarding
the inclusion of trade secret misappropriation within the CFAA definition of "damage."
Ultimately, trade secret misappropriation should be included within the statutory definition of
"damage" because the secrecy of trade secret information, and its "integrity," is impaired with
every disclosure.
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INTRODUCTION

In September of 2003, Former FBI Director Robert Mueller stated that U.S.
businesses are losing more than $200 billion dollars annually from theft of
intellectual property.1 These losses can be attributed to economic espionage, internal
employee theft, and outside hacking of computer networks.2 This should be a concern
for any business because it is estimated that 80% of assets in an information-based
economy are intangible. 3 Indeed, most are also trade secrets. 4 With the simple click
of a button, an electronic file can be deleted, copied, or sent to the other side of the
world.5 The methods for stealing electronic trade secrets through unauthorized
access to computers, hacking of computers, and destruction of data on computers are
evolving at a rapid rate. 6 Therefore, the methods for protecting trade secrets must
develop at an equal pace. 7 American companies must have security measures in
place to guard their trade secret information against thievery, thus maintaining the
J.D. Candidate, May 2009, The John Marshall Law School. M.S. Higher Education and
Student Affairs, Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, May 2006. B.A. Political Science and History,
Miami University, Oxford, Ohio, May 2001. A special thanks to my editor Michael D. Karson for his
invaluable editorial assistance. Thank you also to the staff of The John Marshall Review of
IntellectualPropertyLaw for their support during the research and writing process.
1 Robert Mueller, Dir. Fed. Bureau of Investigations, Address to the National Press Club
Luncheon (June 23, 2003) ("Economic espionage is costing our U.S. businesses now more than $200
billion a year in theft of intellectual property."); see also R. MARK HALLIGAN & RICHARD F. WEYAND,
TRADE SECRET ASSET MANAGEMENT:
AN EXECUTIVE'S GUIDE TO INFORMATION ASSET
MANAGEMENT, INCLUDING SARBANES-OXLEY ACCOUNTING REQUIREMENTS FOR TRADE SECRETS 23
(2006) (discussing losses suffered by business across the country from stolen trade secrets).
2 Soo Asis INT'L, TRENDS IN PROPRIETARY INFORMATION Loss 12 (2007), available at
http://wwwasisonline.org/newsroom/surveys/spi2.pdf.
See MARGARET M. BLAIR & STEVEN M.H. WALLMAN, UNSEEN WEALTH: REPORT OF THE
BROOKINGS TASK FORCE ON INTANGIBLES (2001) (evaluating the importance of intangible assets on
economic growth within the U.S. economy).
4 See id.
5 See 2 JOHN J. FALVEY, JR. & AMY M. MCCALLEN, INTERNET LAW AND PRACTICE § 26:6 (2008)
("Growth in use of the Internet has also offered inviting opportunities for intellectual property
crimes."); R. Mark Halligan, Protecting Trade Secrets Online, in BUSINESS, LAW, AND THE
INTERNET: ESSENTIAL GUIDANCE FOR YOU, YOUR CLIENTS, AND YOUR FIRM 14-9 (Michael S. Simon
& Andr6 C. Frieden eds., 2002) ("The Internet has become an engine for the destruction of trade
secret rights. Within seconds, a disgruntled employee can upload and transmit trade secret
information to the Internet, from which it can be accessible to millions of people around the world.").
6 See 2 FALVEY & MCCALLEN, supra note 6, § 26:6. ("The widespread use of the Internet,
coupled with specific technologies that have developed to facilitate copying, makes intellectual
property theft easier than ever.").
7 Halligan, supra note 5, at 14-10 ("Deterrence of trade secret theft via the Internet is a
daunting task. Hackers are always one step ahead of legitimate computer users. In designing trade
secret protection programs, you should anticipate theft and set traps so that if a theft occurs you can
identify and track down the offender.").
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information's status as a protectable asset.8 Once a corporation or small business,
however, falls victim to trade secret misappropriation, civil litigation becomes the
party's only means to recoup the loss from its damaged trade secret asset. 9
Trade secret litigation will inevitably become more complex as a result of
advances in technology, globalization, employee mobility, and increasing corporate
ownership of intangible assets. 10 In order to meet the demands of complex trade
secret litigation, parties desire the procedural benefits of the federal courts, primarily
nationwide service of process.11 At this time, however, there is no federal civil cause
of action for trade secret misappropriation. 12 Indeed, trade secrets remain the only
major area of intellectual property not protected by a federal statute.1 3 A party
seeking to litigate the misappropriation of its trade secrets in federal court must rely
on the parties' diversity of citizenship in order for the court to have subject matter
jurisdiction. 14 Unfortunately, diversity jurisdiction may not be present in situations
where a current or former employee misappropriates the employer's trade secrets.
Where diversity jurisdiction does not exist, the party's only means to gain subject
matter jurisdiction in a federal venue would be through federal question
jurisdiction. 15
This comment advances a means to secure access to the federal courts in order
to meet the needs of complex trade secret litigation. The Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act ("CFAA")16 can serve as a vehicle to allow aggrieved parties access to the federal
8 Se, 0.g., UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005)
(including a requirement that a trade secret be "the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the
circumstances to maintain its secrecy."); HALLIGAN & WEYAND, supra note 1, at 61 (asserting that,
with the evolution of new threats to information security, corporations and small business must
develop new software, hardware, and business methods for maintaining the secrecy of their trade
secrets).
9 HALLIGAN & WEYAND, supra note 1, at 27 ("The only way to validate a trade secret is through
litigation.").
10See Albert P. Halluin & Lorelei P. Westin, Nanotechno]ogy: The Importance ofIntellectual
PropertyRights in an Emerging Technology, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOc'Y 220, 225 (2004).
Although trade secrets can be a powerful arsenal in the protection of
intellectual property rights, it is becoming more and more difficult to keep such
knowledge confidential. Because of the increased mobility of employees and the
accessibility of the internet, the ease of getting information makes trade secrets
difficult to defend.
Id.
See Roy E. Hofer & Susan F. Gullotti, Presenting the Trade Secret Owner's Case, in
PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS 1985, at 145, 160-61 (PLI Patents, Copyrights, Trademarks, &
Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 196, 1985), available atWL, 196 PLI/Pat 145.
12 See 1 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS I1, DONALD CRESS REILEY, III & ROBERT CLAIRE HIGHLEY,
PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 4:5 (2008) ("Civil liability for misappropriation of a trade secret,
whether predicated on a breach of contract, a breach of confidence, a tort, or on any other theory, is
a state-law claim, not a federal claim.").
13 Compare id. (noting that state law governs trade secrets), with 15 U.S.C. § 1114-17 (2006)
(trademarks), 17 U.S.C. § 501-05 (copyrights), and 35 U.S.C. § 271-73 (patents).
H>28 U.S.C.

§ 1332.

15Id. § 1331 ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
16 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (West 2008). On September 26, 2008, the provisions of Identity Theft
Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 became effective.
Identity Theft Enforcement and
Restitution Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-326, §§ 201-09, 122 Stat. 3560, 3560-65 (2008) (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1030); Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, President Bush Signs H.R.
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courts in order to litigate their trade secret rights. This comment supports the view
that the causes of action within the CFAA defend all electronic trade secrets as well
as trade secrets stored on a computer. 17 The protection provided by the CFAA does
not stop with its causes of action; as long as a party's primary claim arises under the
CFAA, that party can also file one or more state law claims for trade secret
misappropriation through the federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction.18
The CFAA can serve as a "gap-filler" until Congress enacts legislation
authorizing
federal
question
jurisdiction
specifically
for
trade
secret
misappropriation. That authorization could take the form of a federal trade secret
statute or, in the alternative, an amendment to the Economic Espionage Act of 1996
adding a civil cause of action. 19 The CFAA has been challenged by some and
championed by others, but it has a distinct advantage in that it protects all valuable
20
computer data regardless of whether it is proven a trade secret under state law.
Part I of this Comment discusses the traditional state law cause of action for
trade secret misappropriation, provides the statutory background and history of the
CFAA, and discusses cases demonstrating the split in authority regarding the
meaning of terms within the CFAA. Part II analyzes the complexities surrounding
the term "without authorization," and the definitions of, "exceeds authorized access,"
and "damage." Part III advocates for the use of the CFAA in trade secret litigation,
and for the wider adoption of the broad view of the key terms and provisions within
the CFAA in order to ensure access to the federal courts for complex trade secret
litigation.

5938 Into Law (on file with author) available at

http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/O9/20080926-12.html. Because the Identity Theft
Enforcement and Restitution Act of 2008 amended the sections of 18 U.S.C. § 1030, all references to
this statute will refer to the unofficial U.S.C.A. reporter.
17 Nick Akerman & Edward M. Stroz, Trade Secrets.* Computer Security, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16,

2002, at B8 ("The CFAA protects all valuable computer data, whether or not it would be considered
a trade secret.").
18See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); see also Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930

(9th Cir. 2004) (affirming a jury's special verdict in favor of the plaintiffs assertion violations of both
the CFAA and the Idaho Trade Secrets Act).
[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction, the
district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are
so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form
part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the United States
Constitution.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(a).

19See Victoria A. Cundiff, DigitalDefense.*ProtectingTrade Secrets Against New Threats, in
14TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, at 707, 720-21 (PLI Patents,
Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop., Course Handbook Series No. 947, 2008), available at
WL, 947 PLI/Pat 707.
20 See Akerman & Stroz, supra note 17, at B8 ("The CFAA was enacted to 'ensure that the
theft of intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way
theft of physical items are protected."' (quoting Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safegaurd Self
Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1128 (W.D. Wash. 2000)); see also S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 7
(1996).
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I. BACKGROUND

A. Sources ofState Trade Secret Law
Every state in the United States has laws protecting trade secrets. 21 Fortyseven jurisdictions including the District of Columbia have adopted the Uniform
Trade Secrets Act ("UTSA"),22 or some variation thereof, as the basis for its trade

secret misappropriation cause of action. 23

Further, many states derive their trade

secret laws from the Restatement (First) of Torts as well as the Restatement (Third)
of Unfair Competition. 2 4 The UTSA and the Restatements each provide a definition
of trade secret, which is fundamentally the same. 2 5 The doctrinal principle is that a
trade secret is information used in a party's business that derives economic value

from its secrecy.

26

There are three essential elements to a state trade secret misappropriation

claim.

27

First, the information must qualify as a trade secret. 28 Second, the plaintiff

must have made reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure of its trade secret. 2 9 Third,

the plaintiff must prove that the defendant acquired the trade secret through
30
wrongful means.
In order to demonstrate that information qualifies as a trade secret, a party
must show that the information meets the state's definition of a trade secret.3 1

The

UTSA defines a trade secret as information that "derives independent economic

value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not being readily
ascertainable by proper means by, other persons" 3 2 and "is the subject of efforts that

21ROBERT P. MERGES, PETER S. MENELL, & MARK A. LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE
NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 35 (rev. 4th ed. 2007) ("Today, every one of the United States protects
trade secrets in some form or another.").
22UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-659 (2005).
2314 U.L.A. 18-19 (Supp. 2008) (listing the forty-seven jurisdictions that have adopted the
UTSA, including the District of Columbia and the U.S. Virgin Islands).
24MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 21, at 36; see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR
COMPETITION § 39 (1993); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS §§ 757-58 (1939); id. § 757 cmt. b.

25See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 (1993); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
26 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i)-(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005) ('Trade
Secret' means information.., that derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not
being generally known to, and not being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other
persons...."); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 39 ('A trade secret is any
information ... that is sufficiently valuable and secret to afford an actual or potential economic
advantage over others."); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b ('A trade secret may consist
of... information which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it.").
27MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supranote 21, at 37.
28 d
29 Id.
30 Id.

31See Sharon K. Sandeen, A Contract by Any Other Name is Still a Contract: Examining the
Effectiveness of Trade Secret Clauses to Protect Databases,45 IDEA 119, 128-29 (2005) (stating
that under the UTSA there is a proper shift in trade secrets cases to a focus on proving the existence
of a trade secret and not a focus on the relationship of the parties).
32 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(i) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
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are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy."33 A party must
show that its alleged trade secret satisfies allof the elements of the UTSA test. 4 The
Restatement (First) of Torts, as opposed to the UTSA's explicit test, lists several
factors that courts may consider when determining whether information is
protectable as a trade secret.3 5 Those factors are:
(1)the extent to which the information is known outside of [the plaintiffs]
business; (2) the extent to which it is known by employees and others
involved in [the plaintiffs] business; (3) the extent of measures taken by
[the plaintiff] to guard the secrecy of the information; (4) the value of the
information to [the plaintiffs business] and to [the plaintiffs] competitors;
(5) the amount of effort or money expended by [the plaintiff] in developing
the information; (6) the ease or difficulty with which the information could
36
be properly acquired or duplicated by others.
None of these six factors are outcome determinative.3 7 Furthermore, unlike the
UTSA, plaintiffs need not demonstrate that all six factors weigh in their favor in
38
order to prove the existence of a trade secret.
The party alleging trade secret misappropriation must also have made
reasonable efforts to maintain the secrecy of the information it purports to be a trade
secret.3 9 This showing is required under both the UTSA and the Restatement (First)
of Torts. 40 What constitutes reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy varies depending
41
on the circumstances, the size of the entity, and its economic resources.
After making it over the first two hurdles, a plaintiff must prove that the
defendant misappropriated the trade secret or, put another way, acquired the trade

Id. § 1(4)(ii), 14 U.L.A. at 538.
See Sandeen, supra note 31, at 131 ("Obviously, because information must meet the
foregoing requirements to be deemed a trade secret, a trade secret cannot be established by the mere
recitation of its existence in a contract.").
35 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939).
36Id.
37 E.g., Learning Curve Toys, Inc. v. Playwood Toys, Inc., 342 F.3d 714, 722 (7th Cir. 2003).
Contrary to Learning Curve's contention, we do not construe the foregoing
factors as a six-part test in which the absence of evidence on any single factor
necessarily precludes a finding of trade secret protection. Instead, we interpret
the common law factors as instructive guidelines for ascertaining whether a trade
secret exists under the [Illinois Trade Secrets] Act.
33
34

Id.
38 E.g., id. ("The language of the [Illinois Trade Secrets] Act itself makes no reference to these
factors as independent requirements for trade secret status, and Illinois case law imposes no such
requirement that each factor weigh in favor of the plaintiff.").
39UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4)(ii) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 538 (2005).
40Id.; RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 cmt. b (1939) (including "the extent of measures

taken by [the plaintiff] to guard the secrecy of the information" among the six factors used to
determine whether information is a trade secret).
41 See, e.g., Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc. 925 F.2d 174 (7th Cir. 1991)
(defining the meaning of reasonable efforts to maintain secrecy based on an economic analysis);
Elmer Miller, Inc. v. Landis, 625 N.E.2d 338, 342 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993) (stating that reasonable efforts
to maintain secrecy are different for a small business than they are for a larger company).
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secret wrongfully. 42 Essentially, the UTSA defines "misappropriation" as a person,
not the trade secret owner, acquiring the trade secret by improper means. 43 These
three steps provide the basis for the trade secret misappropriation causes of action
based on the UTSA.

B. The Computer FraudandAbuse Act
Congress enacted the CFAA in 1984 as an exclusively criminal statute in order
to protect classified information stored on computers belonging to the government
and financial institutions. 44 The CFAA is an anti-hacking law, but in 1994 Congress
added a civil remedy to offset the monetary damage caused by the criminal
violations. 45 Congress further amended the CFAA to broaden its scope in order to
protect any computer used in interstate commerce and not just those computers used
by the government or financial institutions. 46 Arguably any computer attached to the
Internet can be used in interstate commerce. 47 The CFAA, therefore, protects all
48
networked business computers and the information stored on them.

42 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005); RESTATEMENT
(FIRST) OF TORTS § 757 (1939).
One who discloses or uses another's trade secret, without a privilege to do so,
is liable to the other if
(a) he discovered the secret by improper means, or
(b) his disclosure or use constitutes a breach of confidence reposed in him by
the other in disclosing the secret to him, or
(c) he learned the secret from a third person with notice of the facts that it
was a secret and that the third person discovered it by improper means or
the third person's disclosure of it was otherwise a breach of his duty to the
other, or
(d) he learned the secret with notice of the facts that it was a secret and that
the its disclosure was made to him by mistake.
Id.
43 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537 (2005).
41Nick Akerman & Patricia Finnegan, Computer Law: Civil Relief Under CFAA, NAT'L L.J.,
Dec. 24-31, 2001, at A19 ("Enacted in 1984, the CFAA began as an exclusively criminal statute,
designed to protect classified information on government computers and financial records or credit
information on financial institution computers.").
45 Id.
46 S. REP. NO. 104-357, at 10 (1996) ("[T]he 1994 amendment to subsection 1030(a)(5) ... was
intended to broaden the reach of the provision by replacing the term 'federal interest computer' with
the term 'computer used in interstate commerce or communication."'); Akerman & Finnegan, supra
note 44, at A19.
47 Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 170-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1997).
The Internet is wholly insensitive to geographic distinctions. In almost every
case, users of the Internet neither know nor care about the physical location of the
Internet resources they access. Internet protocols were designed to ignore rather
than document geographic location; while computers on the network do have
"addresses," they are logical addresses on the network rather than geographic
addresses in real space.
Id.
48 Michael R. Levinson & Christopher E. Paetsch, The Computer Fraudand Abuse Act: A
Powerful New Way to Protect Information, INTELL. PROP. NEWSL. (Am. Bar Ass'n, Chicago, Ill.),
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The CFAA provides six civil causes of action that can be used in trade secret
litigation. 49 A person or entity may be civilly liable when it:
1. "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains information contained in a
financial record of a financial institution ... ;"50
2. "intentionally accesses a computer without authorization or exceeds
authorized access, and thereby obtains information from any protected
51
computer;"
3. "knowingly and with intent to defraud, accesses a protected computer
without authorization, or exceeds authorized access, and by means of
such conduct furthers the intended fraud and obtains anything of value,
unless the object of the fraud and the thing obtained consists only of the
use of the computer and the value of such use is not more than $5,000
in any 1-year period;"

4.

52

"knowingly causes the transmission of a program, information, code, or
command, and as a result of such conduct, intentionally causes damage
53
without authorization, to a protected computer;"
"intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and
as a result of such conduct, recklessly causes damage;" 54 or
"intentionally accesses a protected computer without authorization, and

5.
6.

55
as a result of such conduct, causes damage and loss."

The CFAA provides civil relief in the form of compensatory damages or
injunctive relief to any person who suffers damages or loss from a violation of the
Act. 56 The trade secret violation must involve at least one aggravating factor, which
includes (1)loss to one or more person during a one-year period aggregating at least

Spring 2002, at 24 ("Any information, whether or not it is secret, can be protected under the CFAA.
All that most sections of the statute require is that the information be stored on a computer.").
49 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4) (a)(5)(A) -(C) (West 2008).
50 Id. § 1030(a)(2)(A).
51Id. § 1030(a)(2)(C).
52 Id. § 1030(a)(4).
53 Id. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
54 I. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
5

Id. § 1030(a)(5)(C).
§ 1030(g).

56Id

Any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this
section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain compensatory
damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief. A civil action for a
violation of this section may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the
factors set forth in subelauses (I), (II), (III), (IV), or (V) of subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).
Damages for a violation involving only conduct described in subsection
(c)(4)(A)(i)(J) are limited to economic damages. No action may be brought under
this subsection unless such action is begun within 2 years of the date of the act
complained of or the date of the discovery of the damage. No action may be
brought under this subsection for the negligent design or manufacture of
computer hardware, computer software, or firmware.
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$5,000, 57 (I) the modification or impairment of a medical examination of one or more
individuals, 58 (111) "physical injury to any person," 59 (IV) "a threat to public health or
safety," 60 or (V) damage affecting a government computer used for national security,
defense, or justice. 61 There is a two-year statute of limitations for civil relief and the
CFAA does not provide civil relief for the negligent design of computer hardware or
software .62
In order to gain civil relief, a party must satisfy a two-part inquiry: (1) there
must be a violation of the CFAA giving rise to one of the six causes of action
enumerated in the statute resulting in damage or loss, and (2) the violation must
involve conduct described in one of the five aggravating factors. 63 Notwithstanding
the convoluted nature of the CFAA's text, a claim for civil relief may be brought
under any of the six causes of action as long as any of the five aggravating factors is
demonstrated. 64 If the aggravating factor is loss to one or more persons during any
one-year period then relief is limited to economic damages. 65 The CFAA also
provides several definitions of key terms that have become the focus of trade secret
litigation including: "exceeds authorized access,"66 "damage," 67 and "loss." 68 The
57 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(J).
58 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).
,9 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(III).
60 Id. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(JV).
(3IId. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(V).
I2
_d. § 1030 (g).
63 Lockheed Martin Corp., v. Speed, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669, 1671 (M.D. Fla. 2006) ("Thus,
before reaching the merits of the alleged violations, the CFAA's private cause of action sets forth a
two-part injury requirement, where a plaintiff must: (1) suffer a root injury of damage or loss; and
(2) suffer one of five operatively-substantial effects in subsection (a)(5)(B)(i)-(v).").
(34See Fiber Sys. Int'l Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150, 1157 (5th Cir. 2006); P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v.
Celebrations the Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC., 428 F.3d 504, 512 (3rd Cir. 2005); Theofel v.
Farey-Jones, 359 F.3d 1066, 1078 n.5 (9th Cir. 2004);
We do not read section 1030(g)'s language that the claim must involve one or more
of the numbered subsections of subsection (a)(5)(B) as limiting relief to claims that
are entirely based only on subsection (a)(5), but, rather, as requiring that claims
brought under other sections must meet, in addition, one of the five numbered
(a)(5)(B) "tests."
P.C. Yonkers, 428 F.3d at 512. Under the statute effective September 26, 2008, the "(a)(5)(B) 'tests'
are presently located at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i)(v) (2006) (listing the "(a)(5)(B) 'tests''), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I)-(V) (using identical
language to the old "(a)(5)(B) 'tests'). This change does not appear to be a substantive change to the
meaning of the statute. Likewise, under the statute effective September 26, 2008, the "subsection
(a)(5)" claims are presently located at 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C).
Compare 18 U.S.C.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A)(i)-(iii) (listing the "subsection (a)(5)" claims), with 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A)-(C)
(using substantially identical language to the old "subsection (a)(5)" claims). Thus, although the
CFAA has been amended, the substantive effect of the statute appears to remain unchanged.
65 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (g).
i( Id. § 1030(e)(6) ([T]he term 'exceeds authorized access' means to access a computer with
authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the computer that the accesser
is not entitled so to obtain or alter.").
(37Id. § 1030(e)(8) ("[T]he term 'damage' means any impairment to the integrity or availability
of data, a program, a system, or information.").
(38Id. § 1030(e)(11) ([T]he term 'loss' means any reasonable cost to any victim, including the
cost of responding to an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program,
system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or
other consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.").
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CFAA is a complex statute that could be a powerful tool for the protection of
electronic trade secret assets and trade secrets stored on computers, but courts are
split on the applicability of the statute to employee computer abuse.6 9 Since 2000,
courts have grappled with whether to interpret the CFAA provisions and key terms
broadly or narrowly, and the following section illuminates the courts' varying points
of view.

C. CFAA Lines of Thinking: UnauthorizedAceess
1. BroadInterpretation
The meaning of the terms "without authorization" and "exceeds authorized
access" have been the focal point of many CFAA decisions.7 0 And courts are currently
split in determining whether to apply a broad or narrow meaning to the terms.7 1 The
broad interpretation rests on principles of agency law.72 It asserts that an employee
with authorization to access a protected computer, 73 and the trade secrets on it, loses
authorization with the advent of a disloyal mindset toward the employer. 74 One of
the first reported CFAA district court decisions applied this approach 75 and the
Seventh Circuit has expressly adopted it.76
ShurgardStorage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc. 77 is the seminal
case championing the broad interpretation of the term "without authorization."7 8 In
(39See Linda K. Stevens & Jesi J. Carlson, The CFAA: New Remedies for Employee Computer
Abuse, 96 ILL. B.J. 144 (2008) ("A split of authority has developed, however, regarding the CFAA's
applicability to employee computer abuse, and even among the jurisdictions applying the CFAA to
employees, construction and application of the statute vary greatly.").
70 See generally Nick Akerman, Computer Access: 'UnauthorizedAccess, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 12,
2005, at 15 ("Unauthorized access to a computer is a critical element to proving most violations of
the federal Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA).").
71 Compare, e.g., Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d
1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000) (broad interpretation), with Lockheed Martin Corp., v. Speed, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (M.D. Fla. 2006) (narrow interpretation).
72 See Shurgard,119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-25.
73 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(2) (defining the term "protected computer" as any computer "used in or
affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication").
71See Int'l Airport Ctrs., L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006).
Citrin's breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relationship (more
precisely, terminated any rights he might have claimed as [plaintiffs] agent-he
could not by unilaterally terminating any duties he owed his principal gain an
advantage!) and with it his authority to access the laptop, because the only basis
of his authority had been that relationship. "Violating the duty of loyalty, or
failing to disclose adverse interests, voids the agency relationship."
Id.
7, Shurgard,119 F. Supp. 2d at 1121.
76 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 418.
77 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
78 See, e.g., Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (citing ShurqarB; P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the
Party & Seasonal Superstore, LLC., 428 F.3d 504, 510 (3rd Cir. 2005) (same); Register.com, Inc., v.
Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393, 440 (2d Cir. 2004) (same); EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274
F.3d 577, 584 (1st Cir. 2001) (same); Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, No. 04 C 7071, 2005 WL
2369815, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005) (same).
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Shurgard,the plaintiff, an industry leader in self-service storage facilities, developed
sophisticated marketing and business development plans, which were the electronic
trade secrets at issue. 79 As a part of his employment, the former employee was
allowed full access to the confidential plans.80 The defendant, a direct competitor,
offered the former employee a position with its company.8 1 While remaining in the
plaintiffs employ, the former employee sent emails containing the electronic trade
secrets and proprietary information to the defendant.82
The former employee
continued to provide the defendant with the plaintiffs confidential information even
83
after beginning his employment with the defendant.
The plaintiff filed a claim for civil relief under the CFAA alleging that: (1) the
former employee intentionally accessed a protected computer without authorization
or by exceeding his authorized access and obtained information from a protected
computer,8 4 (2) that he knowingly and with the intent to defraud accessed a protected
computer without authorization or by exceeding his authorized access to further the
fraud,8 5 and (3) that he intentionally accessed a protected computer without
authorization and as result of the conduct caused damage.8 6 The court denied the
defendant's motion to dismiss, stating that the plaintiff asserted violations under all
three provisions of the CFAA.87
Safeguard attempted to defend against the plaintiffs claim by arguing that the
former employees were not "without authorization" to access the computers and
information at issue.88 The court was not persuaded and took the opportunity to
broadly define the phrase "without authorization."8 9 The court determined that the
employee became the defendant's agent when he emailed trade secret information to
the defendant.9 0 The court held that the employee's authorized access ceased to exist
the moment he acted against his employer for the defendant's benefit.9 1
In InternationalAirport Centers, L.L. C.v. Citrin,92 the Seventh Circuit took the
opportunity to adopt the broad interpretation of "without authorization" and "exceeds
authorized access" to define the meaning of the word "transmission" as applied in the
CFAA.9, The defendant, Citrin, violated his employment contract when he left his
real estate prospecting job at International Airport Centers ("JAC") to go into work

79 Shurgardc
80

119 F. Supp. 2d at 1122-23.

Id.at 1123.

81 Jd

82 Id.
83 Id.
84 Id. at
85 Id.at
8 Id.at
87 Id. at
88 Id. at

1124 (discussing the claim arising under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(C) (West 2008)).
1125 (discussing the claim arising under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4)).
1126 (discussing the claim arising under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(C)).
1129.
1124.
89 Id. at 1124-25.
90 Id. at 1125 ("Therefore, for the purposes of this 12(b)(6) motion, [the plaintiffs former
employees] lost their authorization and were 'without authorization' when they allegedly obtained
and sent the proprietary information to the defendant via e-mail.").
91See id.(quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958)) ("Unless otherwise
agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires
adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.").
92 440 F.3d 418 (7th Cir. 2006).
93
See id. at 418-21.
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for himself.94 Prior to returning his company-issued laptop computer, Citrin used a
secure-erasure program to delete all the data pertaining to IAC real estate
96
ventures. 95 Importantly, IAC did not have duplicates of the files Citrin deleted.
Citrin also deleted all the data pertaining to his improper conduct while he was in
JAC's employ. 97 IAC sued Citrin for destroying data through the transmission of the
erasure program 98 and also for recklessly causing damage to the computer data
without authorized access. 99
The court reversed the district court's dismissal of the case and interpreted the
word transmission within the CFAA to include both a signal sent via a program
running on a disk or a long distance attack via a virus on the Internet. 100 The court
also expressly affirmed the ruling in Shurgarrdby reading principles of agency law
into the CFAA, stating that unauthorized access occurs when an employee acts in an
adverse manner to his employment.101

2. NarrowInterpretation
Shurgard,Citrin, and their progeny provide a broad application of the CFAA in
trade secret litigation. In other cases, however, courts have applied a narrow
interpretation of "without authorization" and "exceeds authorized access."1 0 2 The
94

Id. at 419.

95 Id.

96 Id. at 421.
97 Id. at 419.
98 Id.,'see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (a)(5)(A) (West 2008)
99Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030 (a)(5)(B).
100 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420. The court interpreted the word "transmission" to mean not only a
long distance malicious attack from an outsider sent via an Internet connection, but also an attack
by an insider via a downloaded program such as the one used by Citrin. Id. The court analyzed the
technology and found that it was irrelevant whether the program was downloaded from the
Internet, or copied from a CD inserted in the computer, or attached via a wire because the only
difference is in the mechanics of the transmission. Nick Ackerman, Business Information: CFAA
and Data Destruotion, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 10, 2006, at 16. The court also distinguished erasing data
through a secure-erasure program, which completely deletes the indexed file from the computer,
from erasing data via the delete key, which only removes the data to free up space but does not
completely remove the data from the computer. Id.
101See Citrin,440 F.3d at 421 ("Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of the agent terminates
if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a
serious breach of loyalty to the principal." (citing Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self
Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112
(1958))).
102 See, e.g., Brett Senior & Assocs. v. Fitzgerald, No. 06-1412, 2007 WL 2043377, at *4 (E.D.
Pa. July 13, 2007) (comparing the broad and narrow interpretations of the CFAA and applying the
narrow interpretation); Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669, 1674-76 (M.D.
Fla. 2006) (applying narrow interpretation of "without authorization"); Int'l Ass'n of Machinists &
Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499 (D. Md. 2005).
Recognizing that Shurgardprovides Plaintiff some support for a broader
interpretation of these statutes, the court, nevertheless, concludes that in light of
the more persuasive statutory interpretations discussed above, the legislative
history, and the fact that the [Stored Wire and Electronic Communication and
Transactional Records Access Act] and the CFAA are primarily criminal statutes,
and, thus, should be construed narrowly ....
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narrow interpretation purports that agency law principles cannot be read into the
statute. 01 3 This line of cases asserts that based on its plain meaning, the CFAA only
applies when (1) a party accessed a computer or information without ever having had
authorization to access the computer or information at all, or (2) a party who had
authorization to some computers or to some information nonetheless accessed a
computer or information that surpassed its authorization. 10 4 Thus, the narrow
105
interpretation does not allow courts to consider the accesser's mindset.
In Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed'0 6 the court narrowly applied the CFAA and
expressly rejected Shurgard.a0 7 Lockheed Martin filed suit against three former
employees each of whom had access to trade secret information regarding a major
defense contract.108 The employees copied confidential and proprietary information
before resigning from their positions and accepting employment with L-3, a major
Lockheed competitor. 10 9 Lockheed responded by alleging three violations of the
CFAA.110 Lockheed argued that: (1) the former employees knowingly and with the
intent to defraud accessed a protected computer without authorization or by
exceeding their authorization and obtained anything of value worth more than
$5,000,111 (2) they knowingly caused the transmission of a program or information,
which intentionally caused damage to a protected computer, 112 and (3) they
intentionally accessed a protected computer without authorization and a result of
such conduct recklessly caused damage. 113 Lockheed also asserted that as a result of

Id.
103 See Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 ("To the extent Citrin holds that an
employee access "without authorization" at the moment the employee acquires a subjectively
adverse interest to the employer, the Court respectfully disagrees.").
104

See id, at 1673.
Thus, it is plain from the outset that Congress singled out two groups of accessers,
those "without authorization" (or those below authorization, meaning those
having no permission to access whatsoever-typically outsiders, as well as insiders
that are not permitted any computer access) and those exceeding authorization (or
those above authorization, meaning those that go beyond the permitted access
granted to them-typically insiders exceeding whatever access is permitted to
them).

Id.
105 See id. at 1674 ("Congress singled out those accessing 'without authorization' (or below
authorization) and those 'exceeding authorization' (or above authorization) while purposefully
leaving those in the middle untouched (those accessing with authorization), regardless of their
subjective intent.").
106 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (M.D. Fla. 2006).
107 Id.at 1673-76.
108 Id.

at 1670.

109 Id. One of the defendants copied 200 documents onto a compact disc (CD")

from his
Lockheed computer before resigning from Lockheed and going to work for a competitor. Id. The
second defendant burned 262 files onto a CD, sent nine files to his personal Personal Data Assistant
('PDA"), and on his last day at Lockheed copied another sixty-three detailed files regarding the
defense project onto two CDs. Id. The final defendant, the third employee, synchronized his PDA
with his Lockheed computer and removed strategic defense project files. Id.
110 Id.at 1672-76.
111 Id. at 1672; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(4) (West 2008).
112 LockheedMartin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
113Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(5)(B).
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the violations, there was a loss to one or more person in a one-year period
aggregating $5,000.114
Even though Lockheed alleged injury sufficient to warrant civil relief, the court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss because Lockheed did not sufficiently
plead the CFAA violations. 115 The court determined that when the defendants
accessed Lockheed's protected computers, they had authorization.1 16 According to the
court, applying a narrow interpretation, the CFAA only protects against wrongful
1 17
access of information without authorization or access which exceeds authorization.
The court stated that Congress singled out two groups of accessers: parties with no
permission to access, which are typically outsiders, and insiders who go above the
parameters of their permissible access.118 The court refused to adopt the agency law
principles asserted in Shurgard and Citrin that an employee's breach of loyalty
eliminates any authorization to access the information. 119 According to the court, the
plain meaning of the statute was unambiguous and there was no need to resort to
2
extrinsic materials to construe the CFAA.1 0
In InternationalAssoeiation of Maehinists and Aerospace Workers v. WernerMasuda,121 a federal district court in Maryland came to a similar decision as the
court in Loekheed Martin by applying the narrow view of the CFAA.122 In this case,
Werner-Masuda, the Secretary-Treasurer of a Local Chapter of the plaintiff Union,
signed a registration agreement giving her secure access to the Union's online
membership database. 123 She subsequently used her access approximately 10,000
times in a three month period to give confidential membership data from her union to
a rival union. 124 The plaintiff alleged violations of the Stored Wire and Electronic
2
Communications and Transactional Records Access Act ("SECA")125 and the CFAA.1 6
Regarding the CFAA, the Union alleged that Werner-Masuda violated the CFAA
when she intentionally accessed the Union's membership database in a manner that
1 27
exceeded her authorization under her signed computer registration agreement.
The court held that under the plain meaning of the statute, Werner-Masuda did not
exceed her authorized access because, as a part of her official duties as Secretary114

Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I).

115 LoekhdMartin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
116Id.at 1673.
117

Id.

118 Id.

119
Id.at 1674-76.
Id.at 1672-73.
121 390 F. Supp. 2d 479 (D. Md. 2005).
120

122

Id.at 499.

Id.at 483. The defendant was authorized to access the Union's secure proprietary website,
housed on the Union's own server, which required entry of a user ID and password. Id.
124Id. The defendant allegedly gave confidential membership information to the Union of
Independent Flight Attendants ("UIFA"), which was formed to challenge the International
Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers ("IAM"). Id. The plaintiff alleged that the
defendant's user ID was used to access the Union internal database approximately 10,000 times in a
three month period in order to search names and addresses of members from four local IAM lodges.
Id. "According to Plaintiff, the members of these four locals comprise the exact same members that
Defendant UIFA is attempting to organize into a rival union." Id.
125 Id. at 484; 18 U.S.C § 2701 (2006).
126 Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 484; 18 U.S.C. § 1030.
127 Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 495.
123
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treasurer, she was authorized to access the membership information and the Union
did not revoke her authorization. 128 The court rejected the plaintiffs argument that
Werner-Masuda exceeded her authorized access to the database because, according to
the court, Werner-Masuda was authorized to access the database under her
registration agreement; she was not, however, authorized to use the information for a
competing union's benefit. 129 Werner-Masuda argued, and the court accepted, that
130
the CFAA applied mainly to outside computer hackers and "high-tech" criminals.
It concluded by saying that Congress did not intend for the term "exceeds authorized
131
access" to have a sweeping meaning and offer broad protection.

D. CIAA Lines of Thinking. Loss and Damage
Although courts are split on the meaning of "without authorization" and the
application of the term "exceeds authorized access," those are not the only terms
within the CFAA that have vexed litigants and the courts. The civil remedy
provision begins by stating "[any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a
violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain
compensatory damages . ...
"132 As a result, the meanings of the terms "damage" and
"loss" have been a focal point of trade secret litigation under the CFAA.133 A court's
interpretation of these terms determines whether a proper CFAA claim has been

128 Id.at 499. The court recognized that the broader interpretation of the CFAA supported the
plaintiffs, but nevertheless rejected that approach and application of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY § 112 because it concluded that the statutory provisions, legislative history, and the fact
that the CFAA was primarily a criminal statute supported a narrow interpretation. Id
129 Id.at 498.
Contrary to Plaintiffs assertion regarding the effect of the Registration
Agreement on [Defendant's] authority to access [the database], the Agreement
states clearly that "by signing this agreement, [she] agreed not to use the
information provided through [the database] for any purpose that would be
contrary to the policies and procedures established by the Constitution of the
Grand Lodge of the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace
Workers."
Thus, to the extent that [Defendant] may have breached the
Registration Agreement by using the information obtained for purposes contrary
to the policies established by the IAM Constitution, it does not follow, as a matter
of law, that she was not authorized to access the information, or that she did so in
excess of her authorization in violation of the SECA or the CFAA.

Id.
130

Id. at 496.
Id.at 499. The court determined that the legislative history discussing the addition of the

1:31

definition of "exceeds authorized access" demonstrates that Congress did not intend to penalize
authorized federal employees whose access might be legitimate in some circumstances and criminal
in others. Id.
132 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (West 2008).
133 See, e.g., Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d. 929 (W.D. Tenn. 2008)
(discussing the meaning of "damage" within the CFAA); Garelli Wong & Assocs., Inc. v. Nichols, 551
F. Supp. 2d. 704 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (discussing the meaning of "damage" and "loss" within the CFAA);
Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, No. 6:04-CV-1374ORL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743 (M.D. Fla.
Aug. 10, 2005) (discussing the meaning of "damage" and "loss" within the CFAA).
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raised and, more importantly, whether a party can receive compensation under the
134
CFAA for its purloined trade secret.

1. The "Loss"Requirement
The loss requirement acts as a jurisdictional bar in trade secret cases. 135 The
CFAA definition of "loss" is:
[Any reasonable cost to any victim, including the cost of responding to an
offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring the data, program,
system, or information to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue
lost, cost incurred, or other consequential damages incurred because of
136
interruption of service."
In order to properly state a claim under the CFAA, the plaintiff must allege two
things: (1) a violation giving rise to one of the statute's six causes of action, and (2)
conduct involving one of the statute's five aggravating factors. 137 The aggravating
factor most frequently cited in civil trade secrets cases is that the conduct caused loss
to one or more persons during any one year period aggregating at least $5,000.138
This dollar figure is the minimum that must be alleged and it constitutes losses
connected with the physical harm to a computer, the costs incurred responding to the
violation, and any destruction to the computer data. 139 It also includes the costs
associated with a loss of business caused by the interruption of service to the
computers or data network. 140 It is well settled from early CFAA decisions that the
statute contains no "single act" requirement, which means that the $5,000 threshold
131Daniel J. Winters & John F. Costello, Jr., The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A New
Weapon in the Trade Secrets LitigationArena, INTELL. PROP., April 2005, at 3.
135 Id.
("In the majority of cases, the jurisdictional threshold has been met by establishing loss
of at least $5,000 attributable to the alleged violation of the CFAA.").
136 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(11).
137 Lockheed Martin Corp., v. Speed, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669, 1671 (M.D.Fla. 2006) ("Thus,
before reaching the merits of the alleged violations, the CFAA's private cause of action sets forth a
two-part injury requirement, where a plaintiff must: (1) suffer a root injury of damage or loss; and
(2) suffer one of five operatively-substantial effects in subsection (a)(5)(B)(i)-(v.).
138 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(); see, e.g., Fiber Sys. Int'l, Inc. v. Roehrs, 470 F.3d 1150,
1159 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(B)(i), now codified at 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 1030(c)(4)(A)(i)(I) (West 2008)); P.C. Yonkers, Inc. v. Celebrations the Party & Seasonal
Superstore, LLC., 428 F.3d 504, 512 (3rd Cir. 2005) (same); Charles Schwab & Co. v. Carter, No. 04
C 7071, 2005 WL 2369815, at *6 n.9 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 2005) (same); Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts
B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1321-22 (S.D. Fla 2003) (same), affd in part,
rev'dinpart without opinion, 138 F. App'x 297 (11th Cir. 2005).
139 See Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, No. 6:04-CV-1374ORL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743,
at *4 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005) (focusing on the word "cost" within the CFAA definition of "loss," the
word "cost' limiting losses to those directly associated with or addressing the unauthorized
computer access).
140 See Creative Computing v. Getloaded.com LLC, 386 F.3d 930, 935 (9th Cir. 2004)
(discerning that lost profits and loss of goodwill constitutes economic damages); see also EF Cultural
Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 584 (1st Cir. 2001) ('[A] general understanding of the
word 'loss' would fairly encompass a loss of business, goodwill, and the cost of diagnostic
measures .. ").
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can be met by aggregating multiple violations in a one year period.141 It is not
difficult to meet the $5,000 loss threshold; rather, the issue in litigation is
determining what damages constitute cognizable losses under the CFAA. This
determination directly impacts whether a court will provide relief for the lost value of
a trade secret.

2. The "Damage"Requirement
In many instances where computer-stored trade secrets are misappropriated,
there will be no physical harm to the computers, no costs associated with responding
to the violation, and no costs resulting from the interruption to the computer
network.142 This is the main reason why trade secret litigation under the CFAA
often deals with the "loss" and "damage" requirements. 143 The CFAA definition of
"damage" is "any impairment to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a
system, or information."1 44 The other reason why trade secret litigation surrounds
the "damage" requirement is that courts have not consistently construed the
definition of "damage." 145 Some courts have held that the CFAA definition of
"damage" includes damage to the trade secret information. 146 Others have held that
trade secret misappropriation alone is not actionable under the CFAA.147 The
following cases highlight the different interpretations of the loss and damage
requirement.
In Shurgard Storage Centers, Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 148 the court
also had to determine, on a motion to dismiss, whether the conduct of a former
employee constituted "damage" under the CFAA. 149 As a part of his employment
with the plaintiff, the former employee had full access to the plaintiffs electronic and

141 Creative Computing, 386 F.3d at 935. C[T]he Computer Fraud and Abuse Act contains no
,single act' requirement.").
142 See Winters & Costello, supra note 134, at 4.
In some situations, no response costs and loss of business costs may be
incurred as a result of the unauthorized access.
In such situations, the
unauthorized access causes no impairment to the protected computer or
interruption of service, and, as such, no assessment by a computer consultant or
employee is required. An unauthorized accessor may simply copy data containing
trade secrets, without damaging the protected computer in any manner.
Id.
143 See id
HI 18 U.S.C.A § 1030(e)(8) (West 2008).
145 Compare, e.g., Creative Computing, 386 F.3d at 935 (broad construction of "damage"), with
Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, No. 6:04-CV-1374ORL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743, at *4 (M.D.
Fla. Aug. 10, 2005) (narrow construction of "damage").
146 See Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1324
(S.D. Fla 2003) (awarding $2,118,000 in compensatory damages to the plaintiff under the CFAA for
damage to the plaintiffs trade secrets), affd in part,rev'd in part without opinion, 138 F. App'x 297
(11th Cir. 2005).
147 See, e.g., Garelli Wong & Assocs., Inc. v. Nichols, 551 F. Supp. 2d. 704, 710 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(asserting that the taking of a trade secret alone does not impair the integrity of the information
and, therefore, does not constitute damage under the CFAA).
148 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
14)

Id. at 1126-28.
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computer-stored trade secrets. 150 The former employee, while still working for the
plaintiff but acting as an agent for the defendant, emailed trade secrets and other
confidential information owned by the plaintiff to the defendant. 151 As there was no
tangible harm to the information, the court had to determine whether this act
constituted "damage" under the CFAA.152
The court looked at the definition of "damage" and determined that "any
impairment to the integrity ... of data ... or information" had to include the damage
to the trade secrets caused by the former employee. 153 The court reasoned that the
word 154
"any" within the definition of "damage" was unambiguous; "any" means
"any."
The court also determined that the word "integrity," which was ambiguous
in the computer context, meant "unimpaired or unmarred condition" and the
maintaining of information in a protected state. 155 The court held that the CFAA
protects intangible information that cannot suffer physical damage the same way
that the statute protects tangible information. 156 The court denied the defendant's
157
motion to dismiss.
Not all courts have taken the same view as the court in Shurgard. In Resdev,
LLC v. Lot BuildersAss'n, 158 the United States District Court for the Middle District
of Florida focused on the "loss" and "damage" definitions within the CFAA and
applied a more limited view of those terms to the trade secret claims. 159 Two former
employees of the plaintiff joined the defendant company and improperly accessed the
plaintiffs website, taking information from one of its databases. 160 Plaintiff argued
that the defendants unlawfully obtained the plaintiffs trade secrets through
unauthorized web-access. 161 The Plaintiff sought to recover damages based on the
trade secret's lost value. 162
The court proceeded with a detailed statutory
construction of the CFAA's "loss" and "damage" definitions. 163 The court held that
the lost value of a trade secret was not a cognizable loss under the CFAA because the
alleged lost revenue was neither a "but-for" result nor a "proximate consequence" of
the damage associated with the unauthorized access and, therefore, it could not
warrant compensatory damages. 164 Further, the court defined "integrity," a word
used in the CFAA definition of "damage," as "wholeness" or "soundness" and stated
165
that "integrity" does not contemplate the loss of a trade secret.

150

Id.at 1123.

151 Id.

154

Id.at 1126.
Id.at 1126-27; 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(8) (West 2008).
Id. at 1126.

155

Id.

150

Id.
Id. at 1129.

152
153

157

158No.

6:04-CV-1374ORL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005).

159Seeid.at *2-6.
160

Id. at * 1.

161Id.

See id. at *4.
Id. at *2.
104 Id.at *4.
162
163

105Id. at *5 n.3 ('Integrity,'

however, ordinarily means 'wholeness' or 'soundness,'

and

contemplates, in this context, some diminution in the completeness or useability of data or
information on a computer system." (citation omitted)).
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II.

ANALYSIS

The CFAA protects all data stored on any computer used in the course of
business. 166 This makes the CFAA a powerful weapon in the fight against the theft
of proprietary information assets. 167 Violations of the CFAA often involve corporate
insiders or outsiders. 168
Insiders are employees and third parties, such as
consultants, who have a fiduciary duty under agency, contract, and employment law
to hold a company's trade secrets in confidence and not to use them for the benefit of
others. 169 Outsiders are basically everyone else. 170 For the purpose of litigation
under the CFAA, however, outsiders include computer hackers, competitors, and
1 71
competitive intelligence professionals.
It is undisputed that the CFAA applies to: (1) outsiders who never have
authorization to access a business's computers, network, or trade secrets, (2)
employee insiders who never possessed authorization to access the proprietary
information, and (3) employee insiders who go beyond the parameters of their
authorized access.1 72 CFAA disputes arise when an employee insider, amongst other
things, inflicts damage to a computer, places a virus on a corporate network, spoofs
network IP addresses, misuses computer passwords, copies confidential files, or
misappropriates trade secrets while the employee possesses authorization to access

1

66 Akerman & Stroz, supra note 17, at B8 ("The CFAA protects all valuable computer data,
whether or not it would be considered a trade secret."'); Levinson & Paetsch, supra note 48, at 24
("Any information, whether or not it is secret, can be protected under the CFAA. All that most
sections of the statute require is that the information be stored on a computer.").
167 See Levinson & Paetsch, supra note 48, at 24 ("The CFAA has the potential to be a powerful
weapon in the arsenal of statutes designed to prevent and remedy the theft or misuse of
information.... The significance of this should not be underestimated.").
168 S. REP. No. 104-357, at 9 (1996).
169
HALLIGAN & WEYAND, supra note 1, at 63. It is both easier and more common for insiders
to steal proprietary information than for a theft by outsiders because insiders are authorized to be
on the computers and access the trade secret. Td.at 81-82. Companies face a catch-22 because they
must disclose trade secrets to employees, consultants, and contractors when necessary in order to
perform their functions, but every disclosure to an insider runs the risk of damage to the proprietary
trade secret information. Id. at 82.
170
Id.at 63.
171 See id.
Outside access by improper means includes access by fraud, trespass, theft,
hacking, and inducing an insider to breach a duty owed to its employer. Id. at 72-79. Access by
hacking is the most common form of outsider access and it is defined as "unauthorized access to
information on the company's computers through their electronic connections to the outside world."
Id. at 77.
172See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669, 1674-75 (M.D. Fla. 2006);
Stevens & Carlson, supra note 69, at 4 ('According to the Lockheed court's analysis, the plain
language of the CFAA reveals clearly that the CFAA was meant to apply to two distinct groups:
those without authorization (for example, outsiders or hackers) and those who have authorized
access but exceed it."). Although Lockheed explicitly referred to only two groups, outsiders (those
without authorization) and insiders who go beyond their authorized access (those who exceed
authorized access), Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1675, the CFAA must also apply to those
insiders who never possessed authorization at all. There is no principled reason to distinguish
between outsiders who clearly never possessed authorization and insiders who also never possessed
authorization.
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the computer or the trade secret information.17 3 It is this last fact scenario that most
often leads to trade secret theft, but it is not evident that courts will afford aggrieved
parties the benefits of the CFAA in this situation. This analysis focuses on the two
essential issues that must be resolved in order to determine if the CFAA will protect
a business that suffers a trade secret loss at the hands of an employee or former
employee who had authorization to access the computer and the trade secrets, but
subsequently misappropriated the information. The issues surround the meaning of
unauthorized access, including both "without authorization" and "exceeds authorized
access," and the losses and damages covered by the CFAA.

A. What Is the Meaning of "Without Authorization"and'Exeeeds Authorized
Access"?
Central to the CFAA analysis in trade secrets litigation is an exploration of the
terms "without authorization" and "exceeds authorized access." This is so because
any CFAA cause of action requires the violation to be caused by a party without
authorization to access the computer or the trade secret information. 174 Further,
three of the causes of action also support a violation of the CFAA by a party that
175
exceeds its authorized access to a computer or the trade secret information.

1. BroadInterpretationof "WithoutAuthorization"
The broad interpretation of the term "without authorization" can be
characterized as a subjective approach.17 6 It looks to the mindset of the employee
and the surrounding circumstances at the time of the misappropriation in order to
determine when the employee's authorization to access the computer and the
computer-stored trade secret ceased to exist. The broad interpretation of "without
authorization" in the CFAA advanced by Shurgardand Citrin finds legal justification
in the fundamental precepts of agency law.177 The tenets of agency law run through

173See Stevens & Carlson, supra note 69, at 2 ("The line blurs when an employee is planning to
leave his job and, while still employed and still authorized to use his employer's computer system,
uses that system for purposes adverse to the employer's interest.").
171See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(A)-(C) (West 2008).
175
176

See id.§ 1030(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4).
Cf Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 ("Congress singled out those accessing

'without authorization' . . . and those 'exceeding authorization' ...while purposefully leaving those
in the middle untouched (those accessing with authorization), regardless of their subjective intent."
(second emphasis added)). Although the Lockheed Martin court ultimately embraced the narrow
interpretation of unauthorized access, it distinguished Int'lAirport Ctrs. v.Citrin, 440 F.3d 418 (7th
Cir. 2006) and Shurgard Storage Ctrs. Inc. v.Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp 2d. 1121
(W.D. Wash. 2000), which both embraced the broad interpretation of unauthorized access. Lockheed
Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674-75. While distinguishing Citrin and Shurgard,the Lockheed
Martin court made explicit what those decisions left implicit; the broad interpretation of
unauthorized access is a subjective inquiry. Id. at 1675.
177 See Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21; Shurgard,119 F. Supp 2d. at 1124-25.
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the employer-employee relationship and provide legal meaning to the relationship. 178
Therefore, agency law should determine whether an employee possesses
authorization to act on behalf of the employer, or possesses authorization to access
information. 179 An agent is subject to a duty to 18act
in the best interests of the
principal in all aspects of the agency relationship. 0 When an agent intentionally
acts contrary to the best interests of the principal, the agent's interests become
adverse to the principal's. 181 The agent's adverse
interests, if unknown to the
principal, immediately terminate the relationship. 8 2 A serious breach of loyalty by
the agent also terminates the relationship.1 8 3 Thus, when the agency relationship
terminates, any authority the agent possessed to access the principal's computers
immediately ceases to exist.

18 4

In the context of the CFAA, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit expressly included agency principles within the meaning of "without
authorization."' 185
It found that when an employee destroys his employer's
proprietary electronic or computer-stored trade secret assets, he breaches the duty of
loyalty imposed on him by agency law. 186 The only basis for authority to access the
trade secret information is the employment relationship, and breaching the duty of
loyalty ends that agency relationship.1 8 7
With the termination of the agency
relationship, therefore, the employee loses all authorization to access its employer's
confidential information.18 8 This approach does not look at the CFAA in a vacuum;
rather, it considers the alleged misappropriator's mindset, the context, and the

178 See HAROLD

GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A.

GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND

PARTNERSHIP 3 (2nd ed. 1990) ("We usually characterize the employees of enterprises which mine,

manufacture, buy, sell or transport, as servants, but they also fall within the general category of
agents, inasmuch as their work is performed subject to the direction of and for the benefit of their
employers.").
179 See Shurgarcd 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1124-25.
180 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is
subject to a duty to his principal to act solely for the benefit of the principal in all matters connected
with his agency.").
181 Soo Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 ("Violating the duty of loyalty, or failing to disclose adverse
interests, voids the agency relationship.").
182 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, the authority
of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests ....").
183Id. ("Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of
the principal .... he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.").
184 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21.
[Defendant's] breach of his duty of loyalty terminated his agency relationship
(more precisely, terminated any rights he might have claimed as [Plaintiffs]
agent-he could not by unilaterally terminating any duties he owed his principal
gain an advantage!) and with it his authority to access the laptop, because the
only basis of his authority had been that relationship.

Id.
5

18 Id.
186Id.

at 419-21.

at 421; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) ("Unless otherwise
agreed, the authority of an agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires
adverse interests or if he is otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal").
187

Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420-21.

188 Id. (terminating the agency relationship terminates any authority that stems from that
relationship).
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circumstances surrounding the misuse when determining whether the alleged
misappropriator actually had authorization.

2. NarrowInterpretationof "Without Authorization"
In contrast to the subjective approach associated with the broad interpretation,
the narrow interpretation of unauthorized access can be characterized as an objective
approach focusing only on whether the employee possessed permission to access the
computer and the computer-stored trade secrets.18 9 Under this approach, if the
employer granted the employee authorization to the data or computer at any time,
the employee's access cannot be unauthorized, making the employee's mindset
irrelevant. The narrow interpretation to the CFAA relies solely on the text of the
statute and declines to read in the principles of agency law or other extrinsic
materials in the interpretation of "without authorization."' 190 Proponents of the
narrow interpretation utilize rules of statutory construction to derive the meaning of
the undefined statutory term "without authorization."191 "The first rule in statutory
construction is to determine whether the language at issue has a plain and
unambiguous meaning with regard to the particular dispute." 192 If Congress used
clear statutory language, so the argument goes, a court should not rely on extrinsic
materials such as legislative history or restatements of the law to derive the
meanings of terms. 193 Where Congress used ambiguous statutory language, courts
should focus on the larger statutory context and resort to extrinsic materials only if
194
the plain meaning of the statute's words produces an absurd result.
The court in Lockheed Martin applied the rules of statutory construction and
concluded that the plain language of the CFAA singles out only two groups of people
who could be "without authorization" as used in the statute. 195 According to the
court, only outsiders, such as hackers or employees with no authorization to access
computers, and insiders who go beyond their permitted access and exceed their
authorized access are without authorization. 196 Under the narrow interpretation of
the CFAA, the statute does not apply to employees who are authorized to access

18) See LockheedMartin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 ("Congress singled out those accessing
'without authorization' ... and those 'exceeding authorization' ...while purposefully leaving those
in the middle untouched (those accessing with authorization), regardless of their subjective intent.").
190 Id. at 1672-73.
191
See Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, No. 6:04-CV-1374ORL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743,
at *2 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005) ("This case turns primarily on statutory construction.").
192 Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673 (quoting Shotz v. City of Plantation, 344
F.3d 1161, 1167 (11th Cir. 2003)).
193 Resdev, 2005 WL 1924743, at *2 (citing Shotz, 344 F.3d at 1167).
194 Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673. ("There is one instance where extrinsic
materials are permitted to define a term: when the statutory language either produces a clearly
absurd result or presents a substantial ambiguity." (citing Shotz, 344 F.3d at 1167.)).
195 Id. at 1675 ("Congress singled out those accessing 'without authorization' (or below
authorization) and those 'exceeding authorization' (or above authorization) while purposefully
leaving those in the middle untouched (those accessing with authorization), regardless of their
subjective intent.").
196
Id. at 1673.
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computers and computer-stored trade secrets, but whose use of the computer or trade
197
secret information is improper.
3. Exeeds A uthorizedA ccess"
Determining the meaning of unauthorized access does not stop at defining
"without authorization" because the statute provides a civil cause of action for
violations caused by those who exceed their authorized access as well. 198 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit stated that the difference between
the meaning of "without authorization" and "exceeds authorized access" is "paper
thin."1 99 The CFAA definition of "exceeds authorized access" is "to access a computer
with authorization and to use such access to obtain or alter information in the
computer that the accesser is not entitled so to obtain or alter."20 0

In Lockheed

Martin, the court stated that the plain meaning of "exceeds authorized access" is "to
go beyond the access permitted."201 Thus, in the context of accessing a computer or
computer-stored trade secrets, the meaning of "exceeds authorized access" should be
202
clear.
Indeed, Congress expounded on the definition of "exceeds authorized access" in
the legislative history of the CFAA. In 1986, Congress added the term "exceeds
authorized access" into the CFAA causes of action 2 3 in order to make the language of
those causes of action less "cumbersome." 20 4 Congress intended the "change to
simplify the language in" the CFAA. 205 The old statutory language read "knowingly
accesses a computer without authorization, or having accessed a computer with
authorization, uses the opportunitysuch access provides for purposes to which such

197See, e.g.,

id.

Because Lockheed permitted the Employees to access the company computer, they
were not without authorization.
Further, because Lockheed permitted the
Employees to access the precise information at issue, the Employees did not
exceed authorized access. The Employees fit within the very group that Congress
chose not to reach, i.e., those with access authorization.

Id.
198 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4) (West 2008); see Int'l Airport Ctrs. v. Citrin, 440
F.3d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 2006).
199 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 420 ("The difference between without authorization and exceeding
authorized access is paper thin.").
200 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(6). See generally EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274
F.3d 577 (1st Cir. 2001) (asserting that an employee with authorized access exceeds his
authorization by disclosing confidential and proprietary information in violation of his employee
confidentiality agreement).
201 Loekheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 ("'Without authorization' means no access
authorization and 'exceeds authorized access' means to go beyond the access permitted.").
202 See S. REP. No. 99-432, at 13 (1986) ("Section (2)(g) establishes [a] definition[] for... the
term 'exceeds authorized access,' . . . which [is] self-explanatory.").
203 Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. 99-474, § 2(c), 100 Stat. 1213, 1215.
204 S. REP. No. 99-432, at 9. ("Section 2(c) substitutes the phrase 'exceeds authorized access' for

the more cumbersome phase [it replaces].").
205) Id. ("The Committee intends this change to simplify the language in 18 U.S.C. 1030(a)(1)
and (2), and the phrase 'exceeds authorized access' is defined separately in Section (2)(g) of the
bill.").
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authorizationdoes not extend.
...206 Congress eliminated this language and added
the definition of "exceeds authorized access"201 to clarify the effect of the statute on
Federal employees. 208 Importantly, at this time, the CFAA was an exclusively
20 9
criminal statute and did not provide a civilremedy.
Prior to the 1986 amendment, federal employees were arguably subject to
criminal liability under the CFAA if they were authorized to access information but
210
did so for "purposes to which such authorization [did] not extend."
[The amendment] removes from the sweep of the statute one of the murkier
grounds of liability, under which a Federal employee's access to
computerized data might be legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal
in other (not clearly distinguishable) circumstances that might be held to
exceed his authorization.
As the committee report points out,
administrative sanctions should ordinarily be adequate to deal with real
abuses of authorized access to Federal computers (assuming, of course, that
no other provision of section 1030 is violated). Like the heightened scienter
requirement, this change serves to minimize the likelihood that a Federal
employee, uncertain about the scope of his authority, would face a Hobson's
choice between the disclosure mandates of FOJA [Freedom of Information
Act] and the criminal sanctions of title 18.211
Congress wanted to make the CFAA less murky in situations where access might be
legitimate in some circumstances, but criminal in other, "not clearly distinguishable,"
212
circumstances.
In Werner-Masuda, the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland followed Congress's mandate and found that an employee did not exceed
her authorized access, as defined by the CFAA, when she allegedly misused
information because she did not go beyond her permitted access. 21 3 It is possible,
however, to draft employment or confidentiality agreements such that an employee's
access may be deemed excessive if the employee violates the agreement through
improper use. 214 The agreement's language must be drafted such that it not only
206 Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984, Pub. L. 98-473, ch.
21, sec. 2102, § 1030(a)(1)-(2), 98 Stat. 2190, 2190-91 (emphasis added); S. REP. No. 99-432, at 9.
207 § 2(g)(4), 100 Stat. at 1215.
208

S. REP. No. 99-432, at 21.

209

Computer Abuse Amendments Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103-322, § 29001(d), 108 Stat. 2097,

2098 (adding a civil action to the CFAA in 1994).
210 S. REP. No. 99-432, at 21.
Id.
Id.
21:3 Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d 479, 499
(D. Md. 2005) ("[Defendant] was authorized to access the information contained in [the database],
and that at the time she was allegedly accessing it on behalf of [the competitor], her access had not
been revoked.").
214 EF Cultural Travel BV v. Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 582 (1st Cir. 2001) ("[Plaintiff] is
likely to prove such excessive access based on the confidentiality agreement between [Defendant]
and [Plaintiff]."); see also Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Byd:Sign, Inc., No. 6:05-CV-456, 2007 WL
275476, at *13 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2007).
[Plaintiff] has actually alleged that the Defendants had agreed [in a signed
confidentiality agreement] not only to refrain from disclosing information, but
211

212
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prohibits certain uses, but also delineates the point where an employee's authorized
2 15
access ends, and liability under the CFAA begins.

B. Does the Misappropriationof a Trade Secret Constitute 'Damage"Under the
CFAA?
In addition to the analysis of what constitutes unauthorized access under the
2 16
CFAA, it is also necessary to analyze the "damage" requirement within the statute.
The CFAA provides a civil remedy in the form of compensatory damages or injunctive
relief to "any person who suffers damage or loss by reason of a violation of this
section." 217 A problem surfaces in trade secret misappropriation cases where the
computer system, data, or information is not damaged, in the traditional physical
sense of the word, because the files are merely improperly accessed, copied,
transferred, or moved to a non-secure device. 218
The issue is whether the
misappropriation of a computer-stored trade secret, or the use of a protected
computer to misappropriate a trade secret, will constitute "damage" under the CFAA.
There are three perspectives to consider in this regard.
The first is that
misappropriation of a trade secret does not constitute "damage." 219 The second is
that misappropriation of a trade secret, coupled with other harm, constitutes

also to refrain from sending or accessing messages on [Plaintiffs] computer
systems for personal gain.
By doing so, [Plaintiff] has alleged more than
misappropriation of trade secrets, but has alleged actual access without or in
excess of authorization. This is enough to defeat the Moving Defendants' motion
to dismiss as to [Plaintiffs] claims under §§ 1030(a)(2) and 1030(a)(4).
Id.
215 See Werner-Masuda, 390 F. Supp. 2d at 498 (reasoning that by signing the employer's
registration agreement, the employee agreed "not to use the information" contrary to the policies of
the employer, but her conduct did not exceed her authorized access).
216 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(g) (West 2008).
217 [d. Section 1030(g)'s requirement of "damage or loss" is phrased in the disjunctive.
id.
Certain CFAA causes of action, however, specifically require a showing of "damage," id.
§ 1030(a)(5)(A), or both "damage andloss," id. § 1030(a)(5)(C). Thus, a showing of "damage," without
more, gives a plaintiff more swords under the CFAA than a showing of "loss," without more.
Further, trade secret misappropriation arguably fits better within the CFAA's definition of
"damage," than it does "loss."
218 See Winters & Costello, supra note 134, at 4.
In some situations, no response costs and loss of business costs may be
incurred as a result of the unauthorized access.
In such situations, the
unauthorized access causes no impairment to the protected computer or
interruption of service, and, as such, no assessment by a computer consultant or
employee is required. An unauthorized accessor may simply copy data containing
trade secrets, without damaging the protected computer in any manner.
However, it is in these situation where the most harm is done to trade secrets.
Id.
21) See Lockheed Martin Corp. v. Speed, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669, 1676 (M.D. Fla. 2006)
(copying of confidential data does not constitute "damage" under the CFAA); Resdev, LLC v. Lot
Builder Ass'n, Inc., No. 6:04-CV-1374ORL31DAB, 2005 WL 1924743, at *5 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10,
2005) (noting that "damage" contemplates "some diminution in the completeness or useability of
data or information on a computer system").
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"damage." 220 And the third is that the very misappropriation of a trade secret,
221
without more, constitutes "damage" under the CFAA.

1. FirstPerspective: MisappropriationDoes Not Constitute 'Damage"
Courts adopting this view derive its foundation from rules of statutory
construction and a limited view of the plain meaning of the CFAA. 222 This
perspective asserts that the meaning of the word "integrity," found in the definition
of "damage," is clear and that courts should not rely on extrinsic materials to derive
meaning for the term "damage."223 The CFAA defines "damage" as "any impairment
to the integrity or availability of data, a program, a system, or information. 2 24
According to this view, the unauthorized copying or emailing of confidential or
proprietary information, without deletion or removal of the information, would not
constitute "damage" within the plain meaning of the CFAA because there is no
impairment to the data, information, or a system. 225 The limited perspective focuses
on the word "integrity" in the definition of damage. 226 One meaning of "integrity" is
"wholeness" or "soundness." 227 Therefore, to have "damage" under the CFAA, there
must be "some diminution in the completeness or useability of the data or
information on a computer system." 228 The first perspective hinges on a physical
229
change in the data, program, system, or information.

220 See Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d. 929, 937 (W.D. Tenn. 2008)
(misappropriating a trade secret coupled with other harm to the data constituted "damage" under
the CFAA); cf.Garelli Wong & Assocs., Inc. v. Nichols, 551 F. Supp. 2d. 704, 710 (N.D. Ill. 2008)
(misappropriating a trade secret alone does not constitute "damage" under the CFAA).
221 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126
(W.D. Wash. 2000) ("The word 'integrity' in the context of data necessarily contemplates
maintaining the data in a protected state.... [T]hus 'damage' could include the alleged access and
disclosure of trade secrets in this case.").
222 See Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673 ("Because the plain language is
sufficient to interpret the disputed terms, this Court need not resort to extrinsic materials.");
Resdev, 2005 WL 1924743, at *2 ("This case turns primarily on statutory construction.").
223 Resdev, 2005 WL 1924743, at *5 n.3.
224 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(8) (West 2008).
225 Lockheed Martin, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 ("The copying of information from a
computer onto a CD or PDA is a relatively common function that typically does not, by itself, cause
permanent deletion of the original computer files. In the absence of an allegation of permanent
deletion or removal, the Court will not create one."); ef Worldspan, L.P. v. Orbitz, LLC, No. 05-C5386, 2006 WL 1069128, at *5 (N.D. Ill. 2006) (parroting the "damage" text of the CFAA without
alleging facts of impairment to the completeness, usebility, or availability of the data was not
enough to meet the CFAA damage requirement).
226 Resdev, 2005 WL 1924743, at *5 n.3; see also Garelli Wong & Assocs., Inc. v. Nichols, 551 F.
Supp. 2d. 704, 709 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (following Resdev); Orbitz, 2006 WL 1069128 at *5 (following

Resdev).
227 See Resdev, 2005 WL 1924743, at *5 n.3 (citing the OXFORD ENGLISH REFERENCE
DICTIONARY 731 (Judy Pearsall & Bill Trumble eds., rev. 2d ed. 2002)).
228 Id.
229 Id. at *4-5.
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2. Second Perspective: MisappropriationPlus Other Harm Constitutes 'Damage"
The second perspective builds on the first, holding that trade secret
misappropriation, alone, does not constitute damage under the CFAA. 230 Rather, the
"damage" requirement can be met when the misappropriation is coupled with other
harm.2 3 1 Intentional conduct that renders a computer system less secure, even
though there was no damage or destruction to the actual data, program, system, or
information, constitutes "damage" under the CFAA.2 3 2 Other harm that qualifies can
include, among other things, transferring data from a secure server to an non-secure
device or external drive, 23 3 spoofing IP addresses, 23 4 or misusing and improperly
235
accumulating valid network passwords.

3. ThirdPerspective: MisappropriationAlone Constitutes 'Damage"
The third perspective of "damage" holds that trade secret misappropriation
alone should meet the "damage" requirement of the CFAA. 2 36 The third perspective

relies on both the plain language of the statute as well and the legislative history
because the word "any" within the definition of "damage" is unambiguous while the
word "integrity" within the definition of "damage" is ambiguous. 2 3

7

The word "any" is

not ambiguous and, in the context of "damage" under the CFAA, it applies to any
damage to the integrity of the data.2 3 8
The word "integrity," however, is
ambiguous. 2 3 9 Another definition of "integrity" is "unimpaired" or "unmarred."240 In

the context of electronic trade secrets or computer-stored trade secrets, "integrity"
means maintaining the data in a protected state. 241 Thus, making a trade secret less
Garelli Wong & Assocs., Inc. v. Nichols, 551 F. Supp. 2d. 704, 710 (N.D. Ill. 2008).
Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d. 929, 937 (W.D. Tenn. 2008)
(misappropriating a trade secret coupled with other harm to the data constituted "damage" under
the CFAA).
2:32Id. ("The legislative history of the [CFAA] supports the conclusion that intentionally
rendering a computer system less secure should be consider 'damage' under § 1030(a)(5)(A), even
when no data, program, or system, is damaged or destroyed.").
2:3:3Id.("This case is distinguishable from Nichols, and Lockheed Martin however, because the
Complaint alleges that, in addition to copying certain information, [Defendant] transferred certain
confidential documents from a secure server to a non-secure shared company drive.").
2:34Four Seasons Hotels & Resorts B.V. v. Consorcio Barr, S.A., 267 F. Supp. 2d 1268, 1322
230

2:31Black & Decker (US),

(S.D. Fla 2003), affdin part,rev'dinpart without opinion, 138 F. App'x 297 (11th Cir. 2005).
235 Soo S. REP. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996) (copying or altering existing network passwords
constitutes "damage" within the CFAA).
236 Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126-28
(W.D. Wash. 2000).
2:37
Id. at 1126 ("The unambiguous meaning of 'any' clearly demonstrates that the statute is
meant to apply to 'any' impairment to the integrity of data. However, the word 'integrity' is
ambiguous in this context.").
2:38 Id.

239Id.
240

Soo id. ("[A]n unimpaired or unmarred condition:

entire correspondence with an original

condition." (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1174 (Philip Babcock Gove
ed. 1993)).
241 Soo id. ("The word 'integrity' in the context of data necessarily contemplates maintaining

the data in a protected state.").
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secure by ' exposing it to additional parties inevitably damages the information's
"integrity. 242
Seeing that there are many ordinary meanings for the word
"integrity," courts may rely on the legislative history of the CFAA to determine the
243
meaning of the word "damage".
The legislative history states, "the definition of 'damage' is amended to be
sufficiently broad to encompass the types of harm against which people should be
protected." 244 The CFAA does not require physical change, erasure, or destruction of
the data in order for there to be "damage" under the statute. 245 Damage to intangible
information, such as a network login password or a trade secret, is within the
246
purview of the CFAA.

III. PROPOSAL
Trade secret litigation is becoming even more complex 247 and many factors can
be attributed to this fact. First, a vast majority of trade secrets are intangible,
242 See Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d. 929, 937 (W.D. Tenn. 2008)
("[Defendant] transferred certain confidential documents from a secure server to a non-secure
shared company drive.
The legislative history of the [CFAA] supports the conclusion that
intentionally rendering a computer system less secure should be considered 'damage' under
§ 1030(a)(5)(A), even when no data, program, or system, is damaged or destroyed." (citation
omitted)).
24:3Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1332 (11th Cir. 2005) ("[W]ords
are given their ordinary, plain meaning unless defined otherwise.").
244 S.REP. No. 104-357, at 11 (1996).
245

See id.
The 1994 amendment required both "damage" and "loss," but it is not always
clear what constitutes "damage." For example, intruders often alter existing logon programs so that user passwords are copied to a file which the hackers can
retrieve later. After retrieving the newly created password file, the intruder
restores the altered log-on file to its original condition. Arguably, in such a
situation, neither the computer nor its information is damaged. Nonetheless, this
conduct allows the intruder to accumulate valid user passwords to the system,
requires all system users to change their passwords, and requires the system
administrator to devote resources to resecuring the system. Thus, although there
is arguably no "damage," the victim does suffer "loss." If the loss to the victim
meets the required monetary threshold, the conduct should be criminal, and the
victim should be entitled to relief.

Id.
246 See Shurgard Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121,
1126-27 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
This example given in [Senate Report 357] is analogous to the case before the
Court. The "damage" and thus violation to the "integrity" that was caused in the
example is the accumulation of passwords and subsequent corrective measures
the rightful computer owner must take to prevent the infiltration and gathering of
confidential information.
Similarly, in this case, the defendant allegedly
infiltrated the plaintiffs computer network, albeit through different means than
in the example, and collected and disseminated confidential information. In both
cases no data was physically changed or erased, but in both cases an impairment
of its integrity occurred.

Id.
247 See Hofer & Gullotti, supra note 11, at 151-52 ("[T]rade secret litigation is not for the faint
of heart.").
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digital, and stored on computers. 248 Second, the proliferation of new technologies
such as PDAs, digital cameras, camera enabled cell phones, instant messengers, and
Universal Serial Bus ("USB") flash drives make copying and transferring confidential
data simple for anyone with access. 249 Third, technology has made the world a much
smaller place. Employees may live in one state, but work across the country in
another, and the workforce is highly mobile. 250 The Internet and ease of travel allows
business to be conducted anywhere. 25 1 And because of technology, the marketplace is
no longer only national, but global. 252

Technology provides legitimate avenues for

conducting business internationally, but technology also opens the door to foreign
economic espionage. 253 Lastly, trade secret litigation is time sensitive, requiring
quicker adjudication and more liberal discovery. 254 All of these factors point to the
conclusion that litigators will require access to the federal courts in order to provide
the most effective means for protecting trade secret assets. As there is no federal
trade secret statute, the CFAA can fill the gap in the law, and afford plaintiffs federal
subject matter jurisdiction. But more importantly, the CFAA also has the ability to
255
provide modern protection for electronic and computer-stored trade secrets.

In order to ensure access to the federal courts and provide the widest amount of
protection for trade secrets owners, this comment proposes that federal courts apply
the broad application of "without authorization." Further, this comment proposes
248 See Cundiff, supra note 19, at 714 ("Many valuable trade secrets, however, are created,
developed, updated or maintained in a collaborative digital environment. Thus most trade secrets
owners will need to focus on computer security as they assess how to protect their trade secrets.").

249

Id. at 715.
Digital technology is capable of not only protecting trade secrets, of course; it
can also place them at substantial risk. Because so many individuals regularly
carry their own personal devices for generating and recording (such as cameras in
cell phones), storing (such as USB drives and iPods), and transmitting (such as
PDAs and instant messaging devices) digital data (and often these functions are
combined in one device, such as the iPhone® device), the trade secrets owner will
want to consider whether it is feasible to restrict those given access to trade
secrets from bringing such devices into highly sensitive areas of the company
where the secrets are stored or may be viewed.

[d.
250 Halluin & Westin, supra note 10, at 225 ("Because of the increased mobility of employees
and the accessibility of the internet, the ease of getting information makes trade secrets difficult to
defend.").
251 See id.
252 See THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY-FIRST
CENTURY (2005) (describing the effects of globalization on American culture and business).
253 See Cundiff, supra note 19, at 714; see alo ASIS INT'L, supra note 2, at 24 (documenting the
increasing instances of economic espionage on U.S. companies from foreign countries, mainly China,
India, and Russia).
251 See Hofer & Gullotti, supra note 11, at 160-61.
[W]here there is a choice between state and federal court, many litigators express
a preference for a federal forum ....
Often, federal dockets are less crowded than
those in the state court. More resources are available to federal judges, including
law clerks. In addition, the federal discovery rules tend to be more liberal than
their state counterpart.
Id.
255 See Levinson & Paetsch, supra note 48, at 24 ("The CFAA has the potential to dramatically
enlarge the scope of litigation and liability for misuse of electronically stored information,
particularly in connection with trade secrets claims.").
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that courts include trade secret misappropriation within the CFAA definition of
"damage." There is foundation for the broad interpretation of these terms in the
principles of agency law, the legislative history of the CFAA, and within the existing
body of trade secrets law. The CFAA provides major benefits for litigators and, in
turn, the trade secrets owners that suffer from trade secret misappropriation.

A. Adoption of the BroadInterpretationof "Without Authorization"
Today, "[e]mployers ... are increasingly taking advantage of the CFAA's civil
remedies to sue former employees and their new companies who seek a competitive
edge through wrongful use of information from the former employer's computer
system." 256 In order to ensure that the CFAA civil remedies are available to a
company whose former employee misappropriates its trade secrets while the
employee possesses authorization to access the computer or trade secret information,
courts should adopt the broad interpretation of "without authorization." 257 Principles
of agency law and the fundamental precept that employees are granted authorization
to access and use a trade secret only for a limited purpose provide two sound and
common-sense avenues for understanding the CFAA term "without authorization."

1. Agency Law and "Without A uthorization"
When a violation of the CFAA involves an employee or former employee, courts
should adopt the broad interpretation of the statutory phrase "without authorization"
and include principles of agency law in its analysis of the violation. The broad
interpretation asserts that an employee is "without authorization" when the
employee acts with adverse interests to the employer's or is responsible for a serious
breach of the duty of loyalty owed to its employer and acts for the benefit of a
competitor. 258 Once the employee develops an adverse mindset regarding the use of
its employer's confidential information, the employee's authorization immediately
ceases to exist. 259 The CFAA focuses on unauthorized access 260 and an employee's
authority to act derives from agency law, therefore the concept of an employee's
authorization terminating due to a serious breach of loyalty should be read into the
Pac. Aerospace & Elecs., Inc. v. Taylor, 295 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1196 (E.D. Wash. 2003).
See Int'l Airport Centers, L.L.C. v. Citrin, 440 F.3d 418, 420-21 (7th Cir. 2006); Shurgard
Storage Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1125 (W.D. Wash. 2000).
258 Citrin, 440 F.3d at 421 (noting that the authority of an agent terminates when the agent's
interests become adverse to the principal's, even if the principal does not have knowledge of it, or
when the employee seriously breaches his duty of loyalty to the principal); Shurgard, 119 F. Supp.
2d at 1125 (stating that the authority of a plaintiffs former employees' authorization ended when
the employees became disloyal to the plaintiff and acted as agents for the defendant); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 112 (1958) ("Unless otherwise agreed, the authority of an
agent terminates if, without knowledge of the principal, he acquires adverse interests or if he is
otherwise guilty of a serious breach of loyalty to the principal.").
259 See Citrin,440 F.3d at 421.
260 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(A)-(C) (West 2008); EF Cultural
256
257

Travel BV v. Zefer Corp., 318 F.3d 58, 63 (1st Cir. 2003) ("L]ack of authorization may be implicit,
rather than explicit.").
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CFAA.261 This interpretation makes sense when the CFAA violation deals with an
employee because the principles of agency law provide the bedrock for the employee262
employer relationship and agency law can be applied to all business organizations.
Further, agency law principles are also read into many commercial state and federal
laws. 263

The application of agency principles within different laws is not novel;

rather it is fundamental and should not be overlooked when evaluating a CFAA
claim.

2. The 'LimitedLicense" and "Without Authorization"
In addition to applying agency principles, when a violation of the CFAA involves
stolen trade secret information, courts should adopt a broad interpretation of the
statutory phrase "without authorization" because any authorization to use or access a
trade secret is given with a "limited license." This concept asserts that an employee
only possesses a "limited license" to use and access a trade secret for a particular
purpose, which limits any authorization to that specific use or purpose. 264 Under the
law of trade secrets, information would not constitute a trade secret if the party with
access to the information, or the computers storing it, were authorized to use the
information in any way and for any purpose. 265 If access and use were not limited,
the information would not be subject to reasonable measures to maintain its secrecy
and, thus, never obtain the protections of a trade secret. 266 Because of the
261 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY § 7 cmt. a (1958) ('Authority' ... is the power of the
agent to do an act or to conduct a transaction on account of the principal which, with respect to the
principal, he is privileged to do because of the principal's manifestations to him.").
262 See REUSCHLEIN & GREGORY, supra note 178, at 3-4 (stating that most of the world's
business is conducted by agents and the principles of agency law apply to every business
organization).
263 See, e.g., Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1602(o) (2006) ("The term 'unauthorized
use,' ... means a use of a credit card by a person other than the cardholder who does not have
actual, implied, or apparent authority for such use and from which the cardholder receives no
benefit."); U.C.C. § 3-402 cmts. 1-2 (2005).
261 See E-mail from R. Mark Halligan, Partner, Lovells LLP, to author (Oct. 25, 2007, 23:14:00
CDT)(on file with author) (explaining that when an employee has authorized access to a trade
secret, that access is granted only for a limited purpose to perform a specific function or task and
when that function or task is complete, the employee's authorized access ceases to exist); R. Mark
Halligan, Safegua-rding Secrets: Twelve Predictions for Trade Secret Law in the New Economy,
CORP. COUNS., Jan. 2000, at 44, 46 (predicting that the principle of limited use will be applied in
trade secret law).
265 See Xantrex Tech. Inc. v. Advanced Energy Indus., Inc., No. 07-CV-02324-WYD-MEH, 2008
WL 2185882, at *17 (D. Col. May 23, 2008) ("To be a 'trade secret' the owner thereof must have
taken measures to prevent the secret from becoming available to persons other than those selected
by the owner to have access thereto for limited purposes." (quoting COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-74-102
(2008)).
266 See Harvey Barnett, Inc. v. Shidler, 338 F.3d 1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2003).
Colorado has adopted the Uniform Trade Secrets Act, which defines a trade secret
as "any scientific or technical information, design, process, procedure, formula,
[or] improvement ... which is secret and of value." In order '[t]o be a 'trade
secret' the owner thereof must have taken measures to prevent the secret from
becoming available to persons other than those selected by the owner to have
access thereto for limited purposes."
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requirement that trade secret information be the subject of reasonable measures to
maintain its secrecy, it would be counterintuitive for an employer not to limit the
information's use. Further, an employer would not authorize an employee to access a
computer or to obtain the trade secrets stored on the computer for a purpose adverse
to the employer, nor would it authorize an employee to alter or use the trade secret
267
information for the employee's personal benefit or for the benefit of a competitor.
The circumstances surrounding the acquisition of a trade secret, such as a
confidential relationship, lead to an understanding that the trade secret's use is
268
limited and that it must remain confidential.
Trade secret owners can also make a "limited license" express by advising
employees in confidentiality agreements, and on the documents containing trade
secrets, that their access to the trade secret is for a limited purpose and exceeding
that purpose terminates the employee's authorization. 269 Further, in a digital age,
reasonable measures to maintain secrecy, as required by trade secret law, should
require that access to trade secrets be for limited purposes. 270 Through application of
the broad interpretation, the employee who has authorized access to information, but
uses it in a way not within the purpose of the authorization, should be treated as
"without authorization" in CFAA civil causes of action. The broad interpretation of
"without authorization" ensures that employee insiders who might be authorized to
access a computer, network, or its trade secrets, if acting within their limited license,
cannot avoid liability under the CFAA when they exceed their license.

Id. (alterations in original) (citation omitted) (quoting § 7-74-102).
267 See Victor G. Reiling Assocs. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 450 F. Supp. 2d 175, 184 n.9 (D. Conn.
2006) (quoting Heyman v. AR. Winarick, Inc., 325 F.2d 584, 587 (2d Cir. 1963).
As the prospective buyer is given the information for the limited purpose of aiding
him in deciding whether to buy, he is bound to receive the information for use
within the ambit of this limitation. He may not in good conscience accept the
information; terminate negotiations for the sale; and then, using vital data
secured from the would-be seller, set out on a venture of his own.

Id.
268 See Ga. Code Ann. § 10-1-761(2)(B)(ii)(II)-(III)
(2008) (defining misappropriation, in
pertinent part, as disclosure of a trade secret by, or derived from, a party who was under a duty to
limit its use); Harvey Barnett, 338 F.3d at 1129 (adopting a version of the UTSA, Colorado
recognizes that in order to gain trade secret status, the owner of confidential information must only
grant access to that information with the understanding that the authorized access is for a limited
purpose).
2 9 Cundiff, supra note 19, at 717.
Prudent trade secrets owners should explicitly legend highly confidential
documents with precautionary language advising those who are given or obtain
access to the materials that their access is conditioned on their agreement not to
disclose the materials to those not under confidentiality contracts with the trade
secrets owner and that any license to view or possess the documents is
automatically revoked if the viewer exceeds the stated use.

d.
270

See id. at 718.
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B. Adoption ofthe BroadInterpretationofDamage
The nature of what constitutes a trade secret and the fundamental principles of
trade secret law support the broad interpretation of the statutory term "damage."
Courts should adopt the third perspective of "damage," discussed supra, and include
trade secret misappropriation within the meaning of the CFAA term "damage." This
perspective is most appropriate because trade secret misappropriation constitutes
"any impairment to the integrity or availability of data ... or information." 271 By
considering the nature of a trade secret in conjunction with the purpose of the CFAA
and its definition of "damage," the misappropriation of a trade secret falls squarely
within the meaning of "damage."272 The third and broadest perspective of "damage"
holds that the term "any" within the definition of "damage" means just that, "any,"
and is unambiguous. 273
Additionally, the ambiguous word "integrity," in the
274
computer context, means "unimpaired" and maintaining data in a protected state.
2 75
Further, making a trade secret less secure also constitutes damage.
The United States Supreme Court explicitly held that a trade secret is
property. 276 The essence of that property is its secrecy. 277 "[T]he extent of the
property right therein is defined by the extent to which the owner of the secret

protects his interest from disclosure to others."2 7 8

Therefore, the integrity of a trade

secret, which is an information asset, is only maintained when a limited number of
people know its contents. Thus, "damage" to the trade secret's integrity occurs when
more people gain access to the information. A trade secret is not "whole," it is not
"complete," it is not "unimpaired," and it is not "unmarred," all different definitions of
integrity applied by federal courts in CFAA cases, when it loses its secrecy. 279 The
271 Compare 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(8) (West 2008) (defining "damage"), with Shurgard Storage
Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (W.D. Wash 2000) (holding

that trade secret misappropriation may constitute "damage" under the CFAA).
272 Shurgard,119 F. Supp. 2d at 1126.
273 Id.
274

Id.
The unambiguous meaning of "any" clearly demonstrates that the statute is
meant to apply to "any" impairment to the integrity of data. However, the word
"integrity" is ambiguous in this context. Webs ters5 New InternationalDictionary
(3d ed. 1993), defines "integrity" as, "an unimpaired or unmarred condition:
entire correspondence with an original condition." The word "integrity" in the
context of data necessarily contemplates maintaining the data in a protected
state.

Id.
271Black & Decker (US), Inc. v. Smith, 568 F. Supp. 2d. 929, 937 (W.D. Tenn. 2008)
(transferring confidential documents from a secure server to a non-secure external hard drive
renders the computer, and data, less secure, constituting damage under the CFAA even though the
data or system was not damaged physically).
276 Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) ("Trade secrets have many of the
characteristics of more tangible forms of property.").
277 Id.; see also Levinson & Paetsch, supra note 48, at 24 ("[Trade secret] laws require proof
that the information at issue qualifies as a trade secret or at least is confidential - meaning that it is
not generally known, it is valuable because of its secrecy, and it is subject to reasonable efforts to
protect its secrecy." (emphasis added)).
278 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1002.
279 See Resdev, LLC v. Lot Builders Ass'n, Inc., No. 6:04-CV-1374ORL31DAB, 2005 WL
1924743, at *5 n.3 (M.D. Fla. Aug. 10, 2005) ("wholeness" & "completeness"); Shurgard Storage
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CFAA
defines
"damage"
as
"any
impairment
to
the
integrity ... of ... information."28 0 And under the CFAA, Congress intended to
protect intangible assets stored on a computer in the same way that the law protects
tangible assets. 281 Based on this analysis, trade secret misappropriation must
constitute "damage" under the CFAA. The broad interpretation of the term "damage"
provides the necessary protection to businesses against theft of their electronic and
computer-stored trade secrets. It also allows trade secret litigators to avoid motions
to dismiss for failure to claim appropriate "damage." This allows the CFAA claims
and the other state law claims brought within the court's supplemental jurisdiction
to remain in federal court, and it also allows for discovery to continue in the case.

C. Benefits of the CFAA
There is no federal trade secrets statute, but a broad interpretation of the CFAA
can act as a gap-filler until Congress explicitly provides for federal protection of trade
secrets. There are three main benefits provided by the broad interpretation for
national trade secret disputes that cannot be provided by state-based trade secret
misappropriation causes of action: (1) the federal courts provide for nationwide
service of process, (2) the plaintiff does not have to prove the existence of a trade
secret or that reasonable security measures were taken, and (3) there would be more
uniformity in the law.
First, the CFAA provides trade secret litigators with federal question subject
matter jurisdiction.2 8 2 This provides the benefit of bringing state law causes of action
that arise from the same case or controversy as the CFAA claim under the district
courts' supplemental jurisdiction, 28 3 but more importantly, it provides nationwide
service of process. 28 4 This benefit cannot be downplayed because often in complex
trade secret litigation the plaintiff resides in one state, the defendant resides in a
different state, and both the evidence of trade secret theft and key witnesses are in
different states around the country.28 5 Litigating this type of case in state court
might require filing motions and proceedings in multiple jurisdictions throughout the
28 6
country in order to depose key witnesses and obtain necessary evidence.
Nationwide service of process avoids this entire situation and saves substantial
amounts of time.

Ctrs., Inc. v. Safeguard Self Storage, Inc., 119 F. Supp. 2d 1121, 1126 (W.D. Wash 2000)
("unimpaired" & "unmarred").
280 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(e)(8) (West 2008) (emphasis added).
281 See Shurgar d 119 F. Supp. 2d at 1128 ("[§ 1030(a)(2)(C)] would ensure that the theft of
intangible information by the unauthorized use of a computer is prohibited in the same way theft of
physical items are protected." (quoting S. REP. No. 104-357, at 7 (1996)).
282 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006) ("The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil
actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.").
283 See id. § 1367(a).
284 See id. § 1391.
285 See, e.g., Pepsico, Inc. v. Redmond, 54 F.3d 1262, 1264-65 (7th Cir. 1995).
286 Rhonda Wasserman, The Subpoena Power: Pennoyer's Last Vestige, 74 MINN. L. REV. 37,
123-25 (1989) (discussing the reach of subpoenas and the need to rely on the cooperation of other
states in order to ensure the ability to reach out-of-state witnesses).
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Second, the CFAA does not require the plaintiff to prove that a trade secret
exists or that the plaintiff took reasonable efforts to prevent disclosure, both of which
are required in all state-based causes of action relying on the UTSA. 287 Many trade
secrets lawsuits fail because the plaintiff cannot prove that the information meets
the UTSA definition of a trade secret. 28 8 Parties in trade secret litigation under the
UTSA spend substantial amounts of time and resources litigating issues surrounding
secrecy. 28 9 These issues include: (1) the timing and methods for identifying the trade
secret, (2) a determination of whether the secret was known by others or publicly
available, (3) whether reasonable efforts were taken to maintain the information's
secrecy, and (4) the economic value of the secret information. 290 Unlike the state
causes of action, however, the CFAA causes of action do not require that the
291
information be secret.
There are, however, certain measures businesses should take to enhance their
CFAA claims. Although little or no case law exists on the subject, these measures
may include: recording evidence of illegal entries and attempts into a proprietary
network, reviewing computers, monitoring public entries into the public website,
displaying terms of use on the website, changing passwords regularly, and having
employees sign confidentiality agreements. 292 All of these protective measures are
proactive steps an employer can take in not only preventing against trade secret
theft, but also to increase the likelihood of proving the intent, unauthorized access,
and damage or loss necessary in a CFAA claim.
Third, every state has different variations of laws protecting trade secrets, which
lends itself to less uniformity in the law. 293 With the proliferation of the Internet,
interstate communication, and global networks comes a need for uniformity
necessary to enhance trade secret protection. 294
If courts adopt a single, broad
interpretation of the CFAA, there will be more uniformity in litigating the
misappropriation of electronic and computer-stored trade secrets.
In the absence of a federal trade secret law, the CFAA is a necessary tool for the
litigation of trade secrets in federal court. The CFAA does not require a plaintiff to
prove that a trade secret exists or that reasonable security measures have been
taken. Further, because of the many variations in state trade secret causes of action,
the CFAA enhances uniformity in the approach to trade secret litigation. Therefore,
287 See MERGES, MENELL & LEMLEY, supra note 21, at 37; see also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT
§§ 1-12 (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. 537-659 (2005). A trade secret must derive independent
economic value from not being generally known, and not be readily ascertainable by proper means,
and must be subject to reasonable measures to maintain its secrecy. Id. § 1(4), 14 U.L.A. at 538.
288 See UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT §§ 1(4) (amended 1985), 14 U.L.A. at 538.
289 Levinson & Paetsch, supra note 48, at 25.
290 Id.
291 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030(a)(2)(A), (a)(2)(C), (a)(4), (a)(5)(A)-(C) (West 2008).
292 See Akerman & Finnegan, supra note 44, at A19 (listing measures employers can take in
order to enhance their CFAA claims); Cundiff, supra note 19, at 712-19 (discussing in great detail
measures employers can take to protect against employee theft of digital trade secrets).
293 Christopher Rebel J. Pace, The Case for a Federal Trade Secrets Act, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
427, 442 (1995) ("The best reason for enacting federal legislation to displace state law on trade
secret misappropriation is the need for national uniformity in this area of the law.").
294 Id. at 448 ('A uniform system is also more appropriate for a nation constructing information
superhighways, nationwide cellular networks, and portable technology systems, all of which simplify
or accelerate the exchange of information.").
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a broader interpretation of the CFAA is advantageous in that it ensures that complex
trade secrets lawsuits can be litigated in federal court.

CONCLUSION

The rise of the digital age has made trade secret theft easier than ever,
necessitating the inclusion of trade secret misappropriation within the purview of the
CFAA. The broad interpretation of the CFAA provides federal jurisdiction for
complex trade secret litigation. The CFAA term "without authorization" should be
understood in conjunction with agency law principles and also the fundamental
meaning of a trade secret. Further, a trade secret is property, which is defined by its
secrecy. Courts should consider this when determining "damage" under the CFAA,
as a trade secret's integrity is lessened with every disclosure. A broad interpretation
of the CFAA can fill the gap in existing trade secret law by providing federal question
jurisdiction for plaintiffs who have been victims of trade secret theft. This will
ensure that litigators are able to utilize the procedural benefits of a federal venue
when litigating complex trade secret suits.

